















STUDENT NUMBER :  7812454 
 
 












UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL 
 
 






I, Viren Singh, declare that : 
1. The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated, is 
my original work. 
2.  This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any 
other university. 
3. This dissertation does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically 
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written 
sources have been quoted, then: 
a. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to 
them has been reflected; and 
b. Where their words have been used, their writing has been placed inside 













































































































SEBOLA AND ANOTHER V STANDARD BANK OF  



































































































































































EXCURSUS INTO THE PURPOSE OF CONSUMER  
LEGISLATION AND SECTION 129 (1) (a) OF THE  































CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR LAW 







































































1 1        General introduction  
 
The National Credit Act1  together with the Consumer Protection Act2 have had a profound 
impact on the South African commercial and legal landscape.3 They introduce ‘substantial 
consumer protection measures’.4  The importance of the NCA must be seen against the 
exponential growth in the credit market over the years. By September 2012 consumer 
credit extension had ballooned to R 1.39 trillion and active consumers had more than 
tripled.5  
 
1 2     Legislation prior to the NCA and brief historical overview   
 
The implementation of the NCA on 1st June 2007 replaced the Credit Agreements Act,6  
the Usury Act,7 and its Exemptions, as well as the Integration of Usury Laws Act,8 and 
amended various other statutes. The Usury Act regulated all money lending transactions, 
credit transactions and leasing transactions. It limited the amount of interest which could 
be charged. The credit provider could charge interest of 29% per annum for loans less 
than R 10 000.00 and 26% per annum for loans more than R 10 000.00. Section 15A, 
introduced in 1988, however, provided for an ‘Exemption’. The motivation for the 
Exemption was that ‘poor’ borrowers could not provide adequate security and so found it 
impossible to obtain loans. Lenders were reluctant to lend because the risk was too high. 
Some lenders indicated that they would lend if they could charge high interest rates.9 The 
first ‘Exemption Notice’ was introduced in 1992 and regulated loans of less than                     
                                                            
1 Act 34 of 2005 – hereafter the NCA. 
2 Act 68 of 2008 – hereafter the CPA. 
3 Otto and Otto ‘The National Credit Act explained’ 2013 xi. 
4 Woker “Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind  
   promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act” 2010 Obiter 2017. 
5 Draft National Credit Act Policy Framework 2013 GN 559 in GG 36504 of 2013-05-29 6. 
6 Act 75 of 1980. 
7 Act 73 of 1968. 
8 Act 57 of 1996. 
9 Woker “Access to redress for consumers : rights without redress are meaningless rights” – paper  
   presented at the International Consumer Law Conference, Pretoria, September 2014. 
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R 6000. 0010  This led to a mushrooming of the lending industry with many complaints of 
abuse.11 The second ‘Exemption Notice’ was introduced in 1999 and applied to loans less   
than R 10 000.0012 payable over thirty six months. It was more stringent than its 
predecessor.   
 
However, there was still abuse such as the failure to supply consumers with proper 
information regarding the true cost of credit. In fact this was a major factor which led to the 
introduction of the NCA.13 In many instances, consumers were forced to enter into fresh 
loans to pay existing ones and were soon caught in a spiralling debt trap.  
 
The Credit Agreements Act regulated the sale of goods on credit, that is, the buying of goods 
over a period of time. This was much more expensive than paying cash. The consumer 
needed to pay a deposit and pay for the goods in a set period of time. The Integration of 
Usury Laws Act extended the application of the Usury Act to the former ‘homeland territories’ 
such as Transkei and Venda. The Usury Act only protected consumers up to a principal debt 
of R 500 000.00 and the Credit Agreements Act had an upper ceiling of R 500 000.00 as 
regards the cash price of the goods. In some cases, both Acts applied jointly to credit 
agreements which created problems.14  
 
Prior to the implementation of the NCA and the CPA, the system of consumer laws in South 
Africa was ‘outdated, fragmented and predicated on principles contrary to the democratic 
system’.15 South Africa did not have comprehensive legislation that clearly spelled out the 
rights and obligations of all market participants.16  
 
In addition, the following problem areas were identified:  
 
                                                            
10 Notice in terms of Section15A of the Usury Act 73 of 1968 GN R 3451 in GG 14498 of 1992-12-31. 
11 Woker (Fn 9). 
12 Notice in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act 73 of 1968 GN 713 in GG 20145 of 1999-06-01 as  
   amended by GN 910 in GG 20307 of 1999-07-16. 
13 Woker (Fn 4) 225. 
14 Otto and Otto (Fn 3) 4. 
15 The Department of Trade and Industry Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework GN  




 Ineffective consumer protection, particularly in relation to the 85% of the population  
in low income groups; 
 High cost of credit and, for some areas, lack of access to credit; 
 Rising levels of over-indebtedness; and 
 Reckless behaviour by credit providers and exploitation of consumers by      
           microlenders, intermediaries, debt collectors and debt administrators.17  
 
In order to address the need for a comprehensive single statute relating to the credit 
industry, the Department of Trade and Industry, in August 2004, published a policy 
framework for consumer credit and subsequently in June 2005 tabled the National Credit 
Bill in Parliament.18 These developments resulted in the National Credit Act, Act 34 of 
2005. 
 
1 3 Provisions of the NCA relating to ‘Reckless Lending’ And ‘Over-Indebtedness’ 
 
The purpose of the NCA and the CPA is to provide a broad framework for consumer 
protection in South Africa in order to promote consistency, coherence and efficiency in 
the implementation of consumer laws.19 The purpose of the NCA is to ‘to promote and 
advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, 
competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry, and to protect consumers’.20 Woker confirms that ‘consumer protection 
legislation was introduced primarily to protect the interests of the poor, the vulnerable and 
the illiterate’.21 Specifically, section 3 (c) (ii) of the NCA aims at discouraging reckless 
credit granting by credit providers. Section 3 (g) proclaims that it is a purpose of the Act 
to address and prevent over-indebtedness of consumers and provides mechanisms for 
resolving over-indebtedness. These new concepts of reckless lending and over-
indebtedness were introduced into the law by the NCA and are distinct consumer relief 
measures. Part D of the NCA deals with over-indebtedness and reckless credit. Section 
                                                            
17 Groen with input from Kelly-Louw “The National Credit Act and its regulations in the context of access  
    to finance in South Africa” (2006) 12 (The Finmark Trust Report). 
18 Roestoff and Renke “Debt Relief for Consumers – The Interaction between Insolvency and Consumer  
    Protection Legislation (Part 1)” Obiter 2010 563. 
19 The Department of Trade and Industry Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework (Fn 15). 
20 Section 3 of the NCA. 
21 Woker (Fn 9). 
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79 sets out the test to determine if a consumer is over-indebted. Section 80 defines 
reckless credit. In terms of section 83, the court may suspend a reckless credit agreement 
or even set aside all or part of the consumer’s rights and obligations. Section 85 provides 
that in any court proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered and the 
issue of over-indebtedness arises or is pleaded, the court may refer the matter to a debt 
counsellor or itself declare the consumer over-indebted and make any order provided for 
in section 87. Section 86 sets out the substantive and procedural aspects of a ‘debt 
review’ embarked upon by a consumer when she approaches a debt counsellor to 
commence the debt review process which would ultimately result in a rescheduling of 
debts, if she is found to be over-indebted. Section 87 sets out the powers of a court to 
rearrange a consumer’s obligations. Section 88 (3) provides that a credit provider ‘who 
receives notice of court proceedings contemplated in section 83 or 85, or notice in terms 
of section 86 (b) (i), may not exercise or enforce by litigation or other judicial process any 
right or security under that credit agreement…’. The debt review process was introduced 
to rehabilitate over-indebted consumers in order that they could once again contribute to 
the economy.22 The importance of the debt review process is established in that some 
363 000 individuals have applied for debt counselling by the end of June 2012 and R8.5 
billion has been distributed to credit providers through the process.23  
 
1 4      The purpose of section 129 of the NCA 
The crucial importance of section 129 (1) read with section 130 of the NCA is that it is a 
‘gateway provision’ to the enforcement process and a ‘vital safety valve.’24  The court 
stated:    
 
‘it has been described as a ‘gateway’ provision or a new prelitigation layer to the 
enforcement process. Although Section 129 (1) (a) says the credit provider ‘may’ 
draw the consumers default to his or her notice, Section 129 (1) (b) (i) precludes the 
commencement of legal proceedings unless notice is first given. So, in effect, the 
notice is compulsory. One of the means by which the legislation expressly provides 
                                                            
22 Draft National Credit Act Policy Review Framework (Fn 5) para 1.9.4. 
23 Ibid 5. 
24 Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC) paras 39- 
    40 (hereafter ‘Sebola’). 
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for its purposes to be pursued is through ‘consensual resolution of disputes arising 
from credit agreements’. Section 129 (1) is pivotal to this. It precludes legal 
enforcement of a debt before the credit provider has suggested to the consumer that 
he or she explore non-litigious ways to purge the default. Specifically, the notice must 
‘propose’ that  the defaulting consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt 
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, Consumer Court or ombud, with the 
intent that the parties resolve their dispute, or agree on a plan to remedy the default.  
The NCR characterised the notice as a vital safety valve designed to prevent 
unnecessary litigation and premature foreclosure on a consumers’ assets. For its 
part, SERI contended that the notice was so pivotal that the legislation demands that 
a consumer must actually be made aware of the options it sets out before legal 
proceedings can be commenced’.25 
 
Section 86 (2) of the NCA prevents a consumer from applying for ‘debt review’ once 
enforcement proceedings have already began. The section 129 (1) notice therefore fulfils 
the vital role of providing a final opportunity to the consumer to make the necessary 
arrangements, including approaching a debt counsellor, failing which enforcement 
proceedings will be proceeded with. Although section 85 of the Act allows a court (before 
which there are proceedings relating to a credit agreement) to declare a consumer over-
indebted or refer a consumer to a debt counsellor, our courts have adopted a fairly 
conservative approach and require the consumer to explain why she had not previously 
taken advantage of the provisions of section 86 or why she had failed to act upon receipt 
of the section 129 (1) notice.26    
 
1 5     Concluding Introductory Remarks 
 
 
Section 129 appears to be straightforward. A notice must be delivered to the consumer. 
However, this seemingly innocuous section in the Act has led to numerous problems. 
Griesel J in ‘Papier’ confirmed that it was ironic that a piece of legislation with such 
admirable intentions had become ‘a fertile ground for litigation’.27 The controversy relating 
                                                            
25 Ibid. 
26 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales 2009 (3) SA 315 (D) 320 F-G. 
27 The National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 – (hereafter NCAA).  
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to the proper interpretation of the notice requirement precipitated an amendment to the 
NCA which was assented to by the President on the 16th May 2014.28 
 
This dissertation will attempt to delve into whether the interpretation of some of our courts 
of section 129 (1) (a) and even the attempt by the legislature to clarify the true meaning 
of the notice requirement is in harmony with the purposes of the NCA. It will be submitted, 
notwithstanding widespread academic and judicial opinion to the contrary, that the 
interpretation attached and clarification provided does not meet the true objectives of the 
NCA. The NCA, whilst balancing the interests of the credit providers with that of 
consumers, is essentially a consumer protection piece of legislation, as stated by Naidu 
AJ in the Durban High Court.29  
 
This paper will attempt to illustrate that, philosophically and jurisprudentially,  there are 
two groups of jurists who, because of their internal value systems and beliefs,  take  
opposing  views  (both  of  which  are  equally  justifiable  in terms of legal jurisprudence) 
to argue their differing positions. It is submitted the tremendously powerful muscle of the 
large financial institutions enable them to lobby government effectively.  
 
 
2 SECTION 129 OF THE NCA AND RELATED  PROVISIONS 
 
2 1  General introduction 
 
Section 129 provides :  
 
‘(1) If  the  consumer  is  in  default  under  a  credit  agreement,  the  credit  provider-  
(a)  may  draw  the  default  to  the   notice   of   the   consumer  in    writing  and 
propose that  the  consumer  refer  the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, 
alternative  dispute  resolution   agent, consumer  court  or ombud with 
jurisdiction,  with  the  intent  that the parties resolve any dispute  under  the 
agreement or develop and agree on  a  plan  to   bring   the   payments  
under the agreement up to date ; and 
                                                            
28 The National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 – (hereafter NCAA). 
29 Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 (2) SA 512 (D) – (hereafter ‘Prochaska’). 
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(b) subject to section 130 (2), may not commence any legal proceedings to 
enforce the agreement before:    
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated  in  
paragraph (a), or in section 86 (10), as the case may be;  and 
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 130.’ 
 
 
As section 129 is to be read with section 130 (1) (a) of the NCA, it is necessary to also 
quote section 130 (1) (a) in full. 
 
 
 ‘Debt procedures in a Court. – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may 
approach the court for an order to enforce a credit agreement only if, at that time, 
the consumer is in default under that credit agreement for at least 20 business days 
and – At least 10 business days have elapsed since the credit provider delivered as 
notice to the consumer as contemplated in Section 86 (9), or section 129 (1), as the 
case may be;…’ 
 
Sections  65 , 96, 168 and regulation 1 of the NCA regulations30 have also been utilised by 
the courts to assist in the interpretation of the notice requirement.  
 
Section 65 (1)  provides that a consumer has a right to receive documents, which must be 
delivered in the prescribed manner, if any. Section 65 (2) provides that the document may 
be served personally, by fax, email or by printable web page in the manner chosen by the 
consumer from the above options, if no method has been prescribed for the delivery of a 
particular document. 
 
Section 96 reads as follows: 
 
‘Address for notice.-(1) Whenever a party to a credit agreement is required or 
wishes to give legal notice to the other party for any purpose contemplated in the 
                                                            
30 GN R489 in GG 28864 of 2006-05-31. 
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agreement, this Act  or  any  other law, the party giving notice must deliver that 
notice to the other party at –  
 
(a) The  address  of  that  other  party as set out in  the  agreement ,   
unless paragraph   (b) applies; or 
(b) The address most recently provided by the recipient in accordance  
with subsection (2)…’ 
 
Section 168 of the Act provides that a document will have been properly served when it has 
been either delivered to that person or sent by registered mail to that person’s last known 
address. The Minister of Trade and Industry is empowered to make regulations in terms of 
section 177 of the Act.  
‘Delivery’ is not defined in the NCA despite it being used in numerous provisions. It is defined 
in the regulations as ‘unless otherwise provided for … sending a document by hand , by fax, 
by e-mail or registered mail to an address chosen in the agreement by the proposed 
recipient, if no such address is available the recipient’s registered address.’  
Prior to the decision in Sebola, our courts were at odds as to the proper interpretation of 
section 129 (1). The words ‘draw the default to  the  notice  of  the  consumer’  and  the  
word   ‘deliver’   has sparked  much  judicial  debate. Section 130 (1) (a) prescribes that the 
notice must be ‘delivered’ to the consumer. Section 65 refers to ‘documents’. The word 
‘prescribed’ is used in section 65 (1). Section 96 refers to a ‘legal notice’ and section 168 
refers to ‘a notice or document’. Section 168 provides that a person will have been properly 
‘served’ when it has been ‘either delivered’ to that person or sent by registered post to that 
persons last known address. Accordingly the debate centres around whether the notice is a 
‘document’ as referred to in section 65 (2). Does the word ‘serve’ in section 96 equate to 
‘bring to the attention of’?  Can the definition of ‘deliver’ in the regulations be utilised to define 
the word ‘deliver’ in section 130 (1) (a)? Can sections 65, 96 and 168 assist in interpreting 
the word ‘deliver’ in section 130 (1) (a)? 
Essentially, there are two schools of thought as to how the section 129 (1) (a) notice must 
be ‘brought to the attention’ of the consumer. The one view is that the notice must actually 
come to the attention of the consumer with the onus being on the credit provider to prove 
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this on a balance of probabilities, at any subsequent enforcement proceedings (hereafter 
the First Approach). 
 
Broadly speaking, the second and contrary view is that mere dispatch of the notice, 
including by registered post, (in accordance with the ‘greater is included in the lesser’31 
principle) was all that was required to comply with the notice requirement. The risk of non-
receipt falls on the consumer (hereafter the Second Approach). 
 
2 2 Court decisions supporting the first approach 
 
The court in Prochaska reasoned that the NCA represents ‘a radical departure’ from its 
predecessor, the Credit Agreements Act. Section 11 of the Credit Agreements Act merely 
provided for the handing over or postage by prepaid registered mail to the credit receiver of 
the prescribed notice. The court was of the view the purpose of the NCA was best served in 
holding that the notice must come to the actual attention of the consumer. Further, as the 
NCA was structured more for the protection of the consumer than the credit provider, ‘a 
stricter interpretation’ is warranted then in the case of previous legislation of this kind32  the 
court held: 
 
‘The words ‘draw the default to the notice of the consumer’, ‘providing notice’ and 
‘delivered a notice’ in the context in which these appear in the previous paragraph, 
to my mind, cumulatively reflect an intention on the part of the legislature to impose 
upon the credit provider an obligation which requires much more that the mere 
despatching of the notice contemplated by Section 129 (1) (a) to the consumer in 
the manner prescribed in the Act and the Regulations. The Credit provider is 
required ,  in  my  view ,  to  bring  the  default  to  the attention of the consumer  in 
a way which provides an assurance to a court,  considering   whether  or  not  there  
has  been   proper  compliance  with  the procedural requirements of ss 129 and 
130 , that default has indeed been drawn  ‘ to the notice of  the  Consumer. ‘Notice’, 
according to the New Oxford Dictionary, means ‘attention; observation’.33 
 
                                                            
31 Rossouw and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 (10) 439 (SCA) para 57. 





Murphy J in First Rand Bank v Dhlamini34  commented that the purpose of section 129 (1) 
(a) read with section 3 (h), is to provide for a consistent and accessible system of 
consensual resolution of disputes and debt restructuring arising from credit agreements 
and that section 129 (1) (a)  was deliberately designed to protect these aims. A non-
rebuttable presumption of service or notice on mere dispatch of a notice in terms of 
section 129 would defeat these aims.35  To avoid unnecessary hardship and to comply 
with the objects of the NCA, the court concluded that section 129 (1) (a) requires that a 
notice of any default by the consumer be brought to his or her actual attention, and that 
failure on the part of the credit provider to do so will bar the institution of legal proceedings, 
with the result that any action instituted before then will be premature.36 
 
2  3  Court decisions  supporting the second approach 
 
Wallis J in Munien v BMW Financial Services and Another37   found that it was not 
necessary that the notice come to the actual attention of the consumer. He held that the 
method of delivery of the notice was as prescribed in the regulations to the NCA. He held 
that a section 129 (1) (a) notice is delivered if sent by registered post to the address 
chosen by the consumer. The sending of the document amounts to delivery and not the 
receipt thereof. He reasoned that it would be impossible for the sender to make sure that 
the notice had been received and that it would have been relatively easy, if the legislature 
required that the notice must actually come to the attention of the consumer, to have said 
so in express terms. He contended that although he considered the purpose of the NCA 
that could not alter the plain meaning of the word in the definition of ‘delivered’ (in the 
NCA regulations). The Court held that this interpretation was in line with interpretations 
of similar provisions in the NCA’s predecessors.  
 
                                                            
34 2010 (4) SA 531 (GNP) – hereafter ‘Dhlamini’. 
35 Ibid para 20. 
36 Ibid para 31. 
37 2010 (1) SA 549 (KZD) – hereafter ‘Munien’. 
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Gautschi AJ in Starita v Absa Bank Ltd and Another38  agreed with Wallis J that the notice 
does not have to come to the actual attention of the consumer but differed in that he held 
that the answer to the question was to be found in sections 65 and 168 of the Act and 
that regulation 1 of the regulations to the Act could not be used to interpret the Act.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeals in Rossouw39 also found that it was not necessary that 
the notice was actually received by the consumer, relying on the provisions of section 65 
(2) rather than on regulation 1. The court found that the risk of non-receipt fell on the 
consumer.  
 
The court in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rockhill and Another40  also, following 
Rossouw, Munien and Starita, found that actual receipt of the notice is not required. 
 
 
2 4  Commentary by academics  
 
Otto41 disagrees with the conclusion reached in Prochaska. He argues that although the 
NCA must be interpreted anew, when other legislation is comparable with the Act, court 
decisions of the past dealing with similar issues may play a persuasive, perhaps even 
decisive, role.  The word ‘notify’ as used in previous statutes is similar to the words ‘bring 
to the attention’ of the consumer. The leading case of Marques vs Unibank Ltd42 decided 
that a ‘section 11’ notice did not need to come to the attention of the consumer but it 
merely needed to be proven, by the credit grantor that it was sent or dispatched to the 
credit receiver. Otto criticises the decision in Dhlamini as it did not refer to decisions under 
previous legislation.   
 
Kelly-Louw supports Otto’s approach. She calls the approaches of the Court in 
‘Prochaska’ and ‘Dhlamini’ ‘stringent’ and ‘rigid’ approaches to the interpretation of 
                                                            
38 2010 (3) SA 443 (GSJ) – hereafter ‘Starita’. 
39 Rossouw (Fn 31). 
40 2010 (5) SA 252 (GSJ). 
41 JM Otto, “Notice in terms of the National Credit Act: Wholesale National Confusion. Absa Bank Ltd v  
    Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors; Munien v BMW Financial Services, Starita v Absa Bank Ltd;  
     FirstRand Bank Ltd v Dhlamini”, (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 599. 
42 2001 (1) SA 145 (W). 
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section 129 (1) of the NCA. She argues that the approach of the Court in ‘Munien’ and 
‘Starita’ are more ‘sensible’ and ‘balanced’ approaches.43 Van Heerden and Coetzee also 
agree with the reasoning and motivation of Wallis J that ‘delivery’ for the purposes of 
section 65 (1) of the NCA means that the document has to be delivered in accordance 
with regulation 1.44  
 
Mills pointed out that the same conclusion (as contended for by Otto, Kelly-Louw, Van 
Heerden and Boraine) could have been reached via a much shorter route provided for in 
section 1 of the NCA which defines the word ‘prescribe’ to mean ‘prescribed by 
regulation’.45 Van Heerden and Boraine state that if the section 129 (1) (a) notice was 
delivered to a consumer in accordance with the prescription in regulation 1 of the NCA, 
for example, if it was sent by registered post but was not received by the consumer that 
such delivery by registered post does not amount to non-compliance.46 On the other hand, 
Tennant takes quite the opposite view and endorses the conclusion reached in Prochaska 
and Dhlamini.47   
 
2 5  Concluding remarks 
 
The brief discussion above illustrates the extent of the disagreement between the judges 
and even academics. It was inevitable that the Constitutional Court become involved in 
the proper interpretation of section 129 (1) (a). Regrettably the entire controversy was as 
a result of the ‘inelegant drafting’ of the NCA.48 If the argument of some of the proponents 
of the second approach is to be accepted, it appears that the definition of ‘deliver’ in the 
regulations was an attempt to cure the lacuna in the Act itself. However, Gautschi AJ held 
that a clear answer to the ‘interpretation question’ was to be found in sections 65 and 168 
                                                            
43 Kelly-Louw – “The default notice as required by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2010) 22 SA Merc  
    LJ 579 – 583. 
44 Van Heerden and Coetzee “Marimuthu Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd unreported  
    case number 16103/08 (KZD)” PER 2009 (12) 4 333. 
45 Mills “National Credit Act 34 of 2005 – Section 129 Notice – dispatch or receipt?” 2009 De Rebus  
    August 26. 
46 Van Heerden and Boraine “The conundrum of the non-compulsory compulsory notice in terms of  
    Section 129 (1) (a) of the National Credit Act” (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 52. 
47 Tennant, “A default notice under the NCA must come to the attention of the consumer unless the  
    consumer is at fault” 2010 TSAR 852. 
48 Sebola (Fn 24) para 66. 
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of the Act and that regulation 1 of the regulations to the Act could not be used to interpret 
the Act.49 In this argument, Gautschi AJ is supported by Kelly-Louw.50 The Sebola 
judgment expressly disavows the reasoning of Wallis J on this point.51 
 
 
3 SEBOLA AND ANOTHER V STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LTD 
 AND  ANOTHER  
  
3 1   Facts of the case and submissions of the parties 
 
Mr  and Mrs Sebola, married in community of property, entered into a home loan 
agreement with Standard Bank. The Sebolas chose the mortgaged property as the 
address where notices and documents ‘in any legal proceedings’ should be served. In 
addition, they specified a post office box in North Riding, Johannesburg as the postal 
address to which ‘letters, statements and notices may be delivered’. The Sebolas fell into 
arrears with their bond repayments.  The bank’s attorney sent a notice in terms of sections 
129 (1) (a) by registered post. The applicants testified that they did not receive it. This 
was because the postal services diverted the notice to the wrong post office. The Sebolas 
attached to their papers a post office ‘tracking and tracing’ report, which reflected that the 
item intended for North Riding had been diverted instead to the Halfway House post office. 
The bank issued summons for the repayment of the full outstanding amount under the 
mortgage bond and an order declaring the property ‘specifically executable’. Judgment 
was granted and the Sebolas sought to rescind the judgment.52  
 
The crisp issue was whether or not the Sebolas had a valid defence to the bank’s claim. 
This depended on whether the bank had complied with sections 129 (1) (a) before 
instituting action. The High Court had decided that the credit provider’s proof of postage 
to the correct (chosen) address constituted compliance for the purposes of section 129.53 
                                                            
49 Starita (Fn 32) 443. 
50 Kelly-Louw (Fn 43) 585. 
51 Sebola (Fn 24) para 61. 
52 Sebola (Fn 24) paras 4-7. 
53 Ibid para 10. 
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In an appeal to the Full Bench, the Court held itself bound to the SCA decision in 
Rossouw.54  
 
 The Sebolas argued that the High Court erred by failing to adopt a purposive and 
contextual reading of section 129. Section 129 should have been interpreted 
constitutionally in the light of the Act’s objectives. The Full Court’s interpretation renders 
the protection the statute affords consumers nugatory. They argued that the decision in 
Rossouw adversely affects consumers who are not well versed in law.55 
 
The bank supported the reasoning in Rossouw. It contended that there is no reason to 
think that the decision does not promote the spirit of the Constitution and the objects of 
the Bill of Rights. The NCA seeks to achieve an equitable balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of consumers and credit providers.56 The bank further argued that the 
Sebolas’ interpretation would unjustifiably limit credit providers’ right of access to court57. 
 
3 2  The majority decision 
 
Cameron J wrote the majority judgment. The court agreed that a major overhaul of 
previous credit legislation was essential and that the statute ‘represents a clean break 
from the past and bears very little resemblance to its predecessors’.58  Cameron J 
confirmed that the main objective of the NCA is to protect consumers but agreed with the 
SCA that ‘whilst  the  main  object  of  the Act  is to protect consumers , the  interests  of  
creditors  must  also  be  safeguarded  and  should  not  be overlooked.59 The court agreed 
that the notice requirement in section 129 cannot be understood in isolation from section 
130.60 Section 129 focuses on the consumer to whom the credit provider must furnish 
notice and to whose notice the information must come. Section 130 tells the notice 
provider what must be done to fulfil the requirements of section 129, which is to ‘deliver’ 
                                                            
54 Ibid para 14. 
55 Ibid para 17. 
56 Ibid para 21. 
57 Ibid para 21. 
58 Ibid para 39. 
59 Ibid para 40. 
60 Ibid para 52. 
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a notice.61 Section 129 requires that the notice must come to the attention of the 
consumer. The critical question is what the statute requires a credit provider to prove to 
establish this.62  It was accepted that one of the statute’s core innovations (section 129 
read with section 130) is significantly consumer friendly. These procedures are designed 
to help debtors to restructure their debts or find other relief ‘before the guillotine of 
cancellation or judicial enforcement falls’.63 Very importantly, the court agreed that access 
to debt counselling and extra judicial resolution will have the most potent impact when the 
guillotine is about to fall.64  
 
The court held that the regulations do not prescribe any method of ‘delivery’ as envisaged 
as section 13065  and the regulations cannot be used to interpret the Act.66 The meaning 
of the word ‘delivered’ must be determined by taking into account the high importance of 
the section 129 notice, against the background of the statute’s other provisions that 
indicate how delivery of notices must be effected. These provisions are sections 65 (1) 
and (2), section 96 and section 168. The court noted that each of these provisions 
appeared to have some bearing on the meaning to be given to ‘delivered’ in section 130. 
Section 65 (2) is applicable where ‘no method has been prescribed for the delivery of a 
particular document to the consumer’. Section 96 (1) applies because the notice 
envisaged in section 130 is a ‘legal notice.’ Section 65 (2) indicates that delivery entails 
making the document available to the consumer through one of the stipulated 
mechanisms, which would include registered mail.67 
 
Section 96 (1) requires delivery of legal notices ‘at the addresses of the other parties as 
set out in the agreement. Section 168 provides that proof of dispatch by registered mail 
is clearly stated to be sufficient for the purposes of service. The court held, however, the 
special importance of the section 129 notice suggest that registered dispatch is not 
enough and that something more is required.  
                                                            
61 Ibid para 62. 
62 Ibid paras 67-68. 
63 Ibid para 59. 
64 Ibid para 59-60. 
65 Ibid para 61. 
66 Ibid para 62. 








‘These considerations drive me to conclude that the meaning of ‘deliver’ in Section 
130 cannot be extracted by parsing the words of the statute. It must be found in a 
broader approach – by determining what a credit provider should be required to 
establish, on seeking enforcement of a credit agreement, by way of proof that the 
Section 129 notice in fact reached the consumer. As pointed out earlier, the statute 
does not demand that the credit provider prove that the notice has actually come to 
the attention of the consumer, since that would ordinarily be impossible. Nor does it 
demand proof of delivery to an actual address. But given the high significance of the 
Section 129 notice, it seems to me that the credit provider must make averments 
that will satisfy the Court from which enforcement is sought that the notice, on 
balance of probabilities, reached the consumer’.68  
 
In practical terms, the evidence required (of the ‘track and trace’ report) will ordinarily 
constitute adequate proof of delivery of the section 129 notice in terms of section 130. 
Where the credit provider seeks default judgment, the consumer’s lack of opposition will 
entitle the court, from which enforcement is sought, to conclude the credit provider’s 
averment that the notice reached the consumer is not contested. If, in contested 
proceedings , the consumer asserts that the notice  went astray after reaching the post 
office, or was not collected, or not attended to once collected , the court must make a 
finding whether,  despite the credit provider’s proven efforts, the consumer’s allegations 
are true and, if so, adjourn the proceedings in terms of section 130 (4) (b).69  
 
The court specifically disagreed with the conclusion reached in Rossouw that the risk of 
non-delivery falls on the consumer. 
                                                            
68 Ibid para 74. 
69 Ibid paras 74-76 and para 87. 
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The court concluded, on the facts of the case, the bank did not deliver the notice as the 
statute obliged it to show that the notice actually reached the correct post office. The 
Sebolas were therefore entitled to the rescission of the judgment. 
 
3 3  Judgment of Zondo AJ   
 
Zondo AJ disagreed with the reasoning of the majority of the court. The minority court 
(Zondo AJ, Mogoeng CJ and Jafta J) held that the main judgment did not give proper 
weight to the fact that section 129 (1) (a) was enacted primarily for the benefit and 
protection of the consumer rather than that of the credit provider. The court said that any 
interpretation of the NCA must promote the purposes of the NCA and actual awareness 
promotes not only consumer protection but also the use of non-judicial mechanisms for 
resolving disputes which the NCA clearly requires.70  The court commented that it cannot 
be that the correct construction of section 129 (1) (a) would place the consumer in a worse 
position than he was under common law. Under the common law, notice of breach of 
contract had to be conveyed to the mind of the debtor before it could be said that the 
creditor had given the debtor notice of such breach or notice of termination and therefore 
could cancel the agreement.71 The court held that purposive construction must be used 
in construing section 129 (1) (a). This is required in section 2 (1) of the NCA.72 Section 96 
applies to the circumstances in the Sebola matter (that the notice must be ‘delivered’ to 
the other party). The court reasoned that that proposition leaves no room for a finding that 
a notice not in fact delivered to such party is good enough.73 The provisions of section 
168 are consistent with the provisions of section 96.74  The court concluded that the 
construction of section 129 (1) (a) which entails that the credit provider must make the 
consumer aware of the default accords with the language of the provision, is fair, gives 
effect to the purpose of section 129 (1) (a) and gives appropriate weight to the legislature’s 
intention to make cancellation and judicial enforcement of credit agreements measures 
of last resort.75 
                                                            
70 Ibid para 107. 
71 Ibid para 122. 
72 Ibid para 146. 
73 Ibid para 168. 
74 Ibid para 74. 




3 4  Concluding remarks  
 
It appears that many of the questions that emerged in the cases prior to Sebola were 
answered, even though there was disagreement amongst the judges of the Constitutional 
Court. Although Zondo AJ differed with the majority of the court, it appears that the weight 
of authority favours the view that section 129 (1) (a) must be read in conjunction with 
section 130 (1) (a). Notwithstanding the finding of Wallis J in Munien, it has been 
established authoritatively that Regulation 1 does not play a part in the interpretation of 
the Act. Sections 65, 96 and 168 play a part in assisting in interpreting the notice 
requirement, according to the decision of the majority of the court. These sections 
however must be balanced with the provisions of sections 129 and 130 read together and 
the importance and purpose of the notice requirement. Mere dispatch of a section 129 (1) 
(a) notice was insufficient. Zondo AJ argued persuasively that the notice must come to 
the actual attention of the consumer and Cameron J, in equally elegant reasoning, I 
submit, appears to have gone for the middle road between Munien and Prochaska. 
Generally, however, proof by the credit provider that the notice was sent to the correct 
post office, in the absence of any contrary intention, would satisfy a court that the notice 
was in fact delivered to the consumer. In the event that the consumer denies receipt of 
the notice then a factual finding would be made on the evidence. Zondo AJ found that 
sections 96 and 168 are in line with the conclusion that he reached. I submit that the 
approach adopted by Cameron J attempted to balance the interests of the credit providers 
and consumers. The approach of Zondo AJ was, as the NCA was primarily a consumer 
piece of legislation, that fact must be given primacy and the law required that the notice 
must come to the actual attention of the consumer.  
 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the highest court in the land having pronounced on the 








4 SUBSEQUENT COURT DECISIONS. 
 
4 1  Introductory remarks 
 
Within a week of the handing down of the Sebola decision, Nedbank Ltd v Aneline 
Binneman and 12 Similar Cases76 served before Griesel J. Shortly thereafter the Durban 
High Court was seized with similar matters. 
 
 
4 2  Nedbank Ltd  v  Binneman 
 
A large number of applications for default judgment came before the court. Most of them 
were based on mortgage bonds registered over immovable properties which constituted 
the homes of the respective defendants.  The representatives of the bank were able to 
provide relevant ‘track and trace’ reports. However it was established that the notices had 
been ‘returned to sender’. The question that arose was whether, in those circumstances, 
the credit provider would be entitled to default judgment.77 
 
The Court held that the principle established in Munien and Rossouw was not overruled 
by the judgment of the majority in Sebola.78  The Court held that all Sebola did was to 
clarify that dispatch per se was insufficient. There must in addition, be proof that the notice 
reached the appropriate post office.  The court held that the bank had duly provided notice 
to the consumer as required by section 129 (1). The risk of non-receipt rested squarely 
with the defendants.79  
 
 
4 3  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize; Absa Bank Ltd v Chetty ; Absa Bank Ltd v Mlipha80  
 
Absa Bank applied for default judgment in four applications in respect of home loan 
mortgage bonds. The ‘track and trace’ reports reveal that the notice had in fact reached 
                                                            
76 Unreported case number 724/2011 (WCC) decided on 21st June 2012 – (hereafter ‘Binneman’). 
77 Ibid para 77. 
78 Ibid para 6. 
79 Ibid para 8. 
80 Case Number 4084/2012, 4115/2012, 3882/2012 [2012] ZAKZDHC 38 (6th July 2012) – (hereafter  
    ‘Mkhize’). 
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the correct post office but the registered item had nevertheless had returned ‘unclaimed’. 
The bank argued that proof of delivery to the correct post office was sufficient, in the light 
of the majority decision in Sebola.  Evidence was provided to the court that during the 
period January to May 2012, Absa Bank sent 1392 letters (by registered post) to 
consumers in respect of unsecured loans, of which 63.6% were returned. Of the 3300 
registered letters sent in respect of unsecured loans, 70% of the letters were returned. Of 
the 19 555 letters sent in respect of credit cards, 70% were returned.81 The court held that 
it was unable to reach a conclusion that the majority judgment in Sebola ‘sanctions this 
Court’ ignoring conclusive evidence that the section 129 notice did not reach either the 
consumer or the consumer’s address.82 The court states that the standard set by section 
129 (1) of the Act is that there must be actual notice to the consumer. The quantum of 
proof necessary would ordinarily be satisfied by the ‘track and trace’ report. There is a 
caveat.  Positive proof of the fact that the notice did not reach the consumer trumps any 
conclusion which suggests that the notice ought to have reached the consumer. The court 
held that the Sebola decision did not endorse the decision in Rossouw.83 Olsen AJ 
specifically rejected the contention that the Constitutional Court endorsed the decision of 
Rossouw that the risk of non-delivery lies with the consumer.84  
 
4 4  Absa Bank v Peterson85   
 
This court held that the notice requirement is satisfied by dispatch of the notice by 
registered mail and its delivery to the correct post office as shown by the ‘track and trace’ 
report. Somewhat surprisingly, it also held that it had enquired into the materiality of the 
defendant (Peterson)  not having received the section 129 notice and concluded he could 






81 Ibid para 26. 
82 Ibid para 51. 
83 Ibid para 53. 
84 Ibid para 58. 
85 2013 (1) SA 481 (ECC). 




4 5       Balkind v Absa Bank87  
 
It was common cause that the section 129 letter was sent by registered mail to the 
applicant’s chosen domicilium address. The ‘track and trace’ report showed that it had 
reached the correct post office, but the notice did not come to the applicant’s attention 
because he had moved from the domicilium address without notifying the respondent 
thereof. The issue was whether these facts constituted compliance with the requirements 
set out in Sebola. The court held that its interpretation of Sebola required that the notice 
had to be brought to the attention of or had reached the consumer and required that proof 
thereof be established on a balance of probability.88  
 
 4 6 Concluding remarks  
 
The judgment of Griesel J set the cat amongst the pigeons. The Learned Judge was, 
however, clearly wrong in stating that Sebola had not overruled Rossouw to the extent 
that it held the risk of non-delivery rested on the consumer. Sebola had expressly made 
a finding rejecting that contention in Rossouw. The weight of judicial authority including 
decisions in Mkhize, Balkind, Standard Bank v Van Vuuren and Several Other Matters89 
favour the view that the gravamen  of the Sebola judgment was that the notice must come 
to the attention of the consumer and that ordinarily and in the absence of any contrary 
indication sufficient proof of delivery shall be contained in the ‘track and trace’ report 
indicating that the notice had been delivered to the correct post office (especially in the 
absence of any opposition to the application for default judgement made by the credit 
provider). With respect, it appears that Griesel J’s judgment is a criticism of the Sebola 







87 2013 (2) SA 486 (ECG).  
88 Ibid para 26 et seq. 
89 Unreported case number 32874/2012 (GSJ) para 6-7. 
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5  KUBYANA V STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LTD90  
 
5 1  Facts of the case and submissions by the parties  
 
Following the different interpretations of the ‘Sebola’ judgment it again became necessary 
for the Constitutional Court to provide direction.  This decision followed a full trial in the 
South Gauteng High Court in which the court granted judgment in favour of the bank. 
Evidence showed that the bank had sent Mr Kubyana a notice in terms of section 129, 
which notice was sent to the correct post office in (according to the ‘track and trace’ report) 
which was the Pretoria North Post Office. The post office sent a notification to the address 
nominated by Mr Kubyana that an item had been sent by registered mail and was awaiting 
his collection. Notwithstanding a second notification given seven days later, Mr Kubyana 
did not respond. The bank also contacted the defendant on numerous occasions both 
telephonically and in person, to no avail.91  Mr Kubyana did not give evidence in the trial 
and the Constitutional Court found that the dispute was fully ventilated in the High Court 
before Ledwaba J.92  The High Court concluded that Mr Kubyana had a duty to explain 
why the notice did not reach him notwithstanding the bank’s efforts, and that his failure to 
do so had to count against him.93  
 
In the Constitutional Court, Mr Kubyana contended, as the registered post was returned 
to the credit provider ‘unclaimed’, this showed that there had not been proper compliance 
with the Act as the notice had not come to the attention of the consumer for whom it was 
intended. It was argued that the fact that the section 129 notice was returned to the bank 
‘constituted an indication contradicting the inference of proper delivery’.94  The issue 
before the court was what must a credit provider do to satisfy a court that it has discharged 
its obligation to effect proper delivery of a statutory notice.95  The bank argued that once 
it was proved that the section 129  (1) (a) notice was sent by registered mail to the correct 
branch of the post office, the credit provider may credibly aver receipt of the notice by the 
                                                            
90 [2014] ZACC 1. 
91 Ibid paras 3-5. 
92 Ibid para 7. 
93 Ibid para 8. 
94 Ibid para 11. 
95 Ibid para 1. 
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consumer. The bank argued that the requirements of the Act were satisfied and that the 
burden of rebuttal then shifts to the consumer as to place additional requirements on the 
credit provider would impose ‘too onerous’ a burden.96   
 
5 2  Decision of the majority of the court 
 
Mhlanthla AJ wrote the majority judgment on behalf of the Court. The court held that there 
was no general requirement that the notice be brought to the consumer’s subjective 
attention or that personal service is required. The credit provider is expected to take steps 
to effect delivery of the notice which would bring it to the attention of a ‘reasonable 
consumer’.97  Once a notice has been dispatched by registered mail and the post office 
has delivered the notification to the consumer’s designated address, valid delivery will not 
take place if the notice would not have come to the attention of a ‘reasonable consumer’. 
However, if the credit provider complied with the requirements, it will be up to  the  
consumer  to  show  that  the notice did not come to the attention of the consumer and 
the reasons why it did not.98  
 
The Court concluded : 
 
‘In sum, the Act does not require a credit provider to bring the contents of a Section 
129 notice to the subjective attention of a consumer. Rather, delivery consists of 
taking certain steps, prescribed by the Act, to apprise a reasonable consumer of the 
notice. Thus, a credit provider’s obligation may be able to make the Section 129 
notice available to the consumer by having it delivered to a designated address. 
When the consumer has elected to receive notices by way of the postal service, the 
credit provider’s obligation to deliver generally consists of despatching the notice by 
registered mail, ensuring that the notice reaches the correct branch of the Post Office 
for collection and ensuring that the Post Office notifies the consumer (at her 
designated address) that a registered item is awaiting collection. This is subject to 
the narrow qualification that, if these steps would not have drawn a reasonable 
                                                            
96 Ibid para 12. 
97 Ibid para 97. 
98 Ibid para 98. 
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consumer’s attention to the Section 129 notices, delivery will not have been effected. 
The ultimate question is whether delivery as envisaged in the Act has been effected. 
In each case, this must be determined by evidence’.99  
 
The court concluded that Mr Kubyana did not act as a ‘reasonable consumer’ in not 
collecting the Section 129 notice and accordingly dismissed the appeal.  
 
5 3 Decision of Jafta J  
 
Jafta J wrote a separate concurring judgment. He discussed the interpretation of section 
129 (1) of the Act and further provided clarification on the judgment of the court in Sebola.  
The judge ruled that the meaning of the words ‘delivered a notice to the consumer’ is 
critical to the application of this section. 
 
Jafta J further states that there is a presumption that, for example, if the credit provider 
chose to send the letter by ordinary post, proof of   the letter   reaching the   consumer’s 
address would ordinarily constitute delivery contemplated in the relevant section. 
However, if the consumer establishes that at the relevant time she was lying unconscious 
in hospital the credit provider would had failed to prove delivery.  If the consumer is unable 
to provide a satisfactory explanation, the court will probably be satisfied that the notice 
reached the consumer.100 As long as the credit provider is able to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the notice is likely to have reached the consumer, the court would be 
satisfied that the notice was delivered.101 
 
Jafta J further  interprets the Sebola judgment to mean that the section 129 notice must 
be taken to the consumer and must reach the consumer but  that it need not necessarily 
be viewed by the consumer. The court expressly disagreed with the interpretation of  





99 Ibid para 39. 
100 Ibid paras 81-82. 
101 Ibid para 83. 
102 Ibid para 98. 
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5 4 Concluding remarks 
 
 
Tsusi comments on the Kubyana judgment. He argues that the notice requirement is 
satisfied when the notice has been sent to the correct post office and thereafter it is up to 
the consumer to elect whether she collects the notice or not. He is of the view that Mr 
Kubyana relied on the wrong interpretation of the Sebola case, which was not concerned 
with a situation where a notice had been validly delivered but which had remained 
uncollected by the consumer. In Sebola, the notice was sent to the wrong post office.103  
 
In a ‘Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr’ newsletter, the authors conclude that there is an onus on 
consumers to receive notices and not deliberately fail to collect them and rely on this 
failure to attempt to avoid legal action.104  
 
 
6 THE NATIONAL CREDIT AMENDMENT ACT105  
 
 6 1     Introductory remarks 
 
It was inevitable that the legislature provide clarity as regards section 129 (1) (a) following 
dissenting views of eminent jurists. The decisions of judges in the same division differed. 
Judges from different divisions gave conflicting judgments. The SCA judgment in 
Rossouw was overruled by the Constitutional Court in Sebola. Sebola itself was subject 
to differing interpretations in the Western Cape High Court and the Durban High Court. It 
became necessary for the Constitutional Court in Kubyana to revisit the issue and it is 
certain that the interpretation of Kubyana would have, itself, become fertile ground for 
further litigation. Even the Chief Justice differed with the majority of his Constitutional 




103 Tsusi ‘The new approach of Section 129 of the National Credit Act’ De Rebus June 2014 38-39. 
104 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Publication ‘Finance and Banking Alert’ – dated 14th May 2014 5. 
105 Fn 28. 
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6 2    Background to the NCAA 
On 23rd May 2013, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Rob Davies, published the Draft 
National Credit Act Policy Review Framework for broader public comment. Whilst 
recording the positive contributions of the NCA, the policy document attempts to meet the 
challenges that have emerged since the passing of the NCA in 2005. The policy seeks to 
resolve ‘legislative failures, including ambiguous drafting, incomplete provisions and 
unintended consequences relating to weak outcomes such as interpretation or 
implementation discrepancies’.106  
  
One of the major challenges that have emerged is that there are loopholes in the 
legislation that still allow for entities to avoid the provisions of the NCA. The NCAA’s stated 
purpose is to close the lacunae in the NCA.107 The policy document states clearly that 
effective consumer redress is the cornerstone of consumer protection legislation.108  
 
In his introductory address to Parliament on the National Credit Amendment Bill on 27th 
February 2014, Davies asserted that although the NCA achieved substantially its 
purposes, there was a need for certain amendments. He records, as a result of gaps in 
the implementation of debt counselling and debt review process, credit providers use 
parallel legal processes such as repossessions of homes in total disregard of the 
mechanisms in place to assist consumers to meet their obligations.109  
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) briefed the Select Committee on Trade and 
International Relations on the National Credit Amendment Bill, 2013 in Parliament. In the 
briefing the DTI stressed that although the NCA has been successful, there are areas of 
improvement that have been identified to make it more effective. The briefing highlighted 
the ‘interpretation difficulties such as can be found in Section 129 regarding notifying the 
consumer of the default’.110 
                                                            
106 National Credit Act Policy Review Framework (Fn 5) 9. 
107 Ibid 8. 
108 Ibid 33. 
109 Rob Davies – “Why the National Credit Amendment Bill?” – www.dti.co.za (accessed 23rd June 2014). 
110 Presentation on the National Credit Amendment Bill by the Department of Trade and Industry –  




6 3     The amendment 
 
Following the legislative process, the NCAA, was assented to by the President on the 19th 
May 2014.  The amendment to section 129 reads:  
‘(5)  the notice contemplated in subsection (1) (a) must be delivered   
             to the consumer –  
(a)   by  registered  mail;  or  
(b)  to  an  adult  person  at  the  location  designated  by  the  consumer. 
(6) The consumer must be   in   writing   indicate   the   preferred   manner   of 
  delivery contemplated in Subsection (5); 
(7) Proof of delivery contemplated in subsection (5) is satisfied by – 
(a)   written  confirmation  by  postal  service   or   its   authorised   agent,   of 
 delivery  to  the  relevant  post  office  or  postal  agency;  or  
  (b)  the signature  or  identifying  mark   of   the   recipient   contemplated  in  
            subsection (5) (b).’ 
 
6 4  Concluding remarks  
 
 
The legislature has seen fit to provide legislative guidance in the interpretation of section 
129. The NCAA has not yet come into operation. I submit that its interpretation, in itself, 
will become a fertile ground for litigation, given the importance of the section 129 (1) (a) 
notice as well as the competing and substantial interests of the credit providers and 
consumers. A crucial question is whether the NCAA has met the objectives of the NCA 
and whether it has placed the interests of one stakeholder above the other. In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to set out the objectives of the NCA, as enumerated, 









7 EXCURSUS INTO THE PURPOSE OF CONSUMER LEGISLATION AND 
 SECTION 129 (1) (a) OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT   
 
7 1  Legislation 
It is clear from a perusal of section 3 of the NCA111  that one of the stated objects and 
purposes of the Act is to ‘protect consumers’. Section 3 (e) provides as follows: 
 
 ‘(e)  Addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between     
        consumers and credit providers by: 
(i) Providing consumers with education about credit and consumers rights; 
(ii) Providing consumers with adequate disclosure of standardised 
 information in  order to make informed choices ; and 
(iii) Providing consumers with protection from deception, and unfair or 
 fraudulent conduct by credit providers and credit bureaux.’ 
 
Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA)   sets out the purpose and policy of the 
Act. It is aimed at consumer protection.112   
 
7 2      Purpose of the legislation as reflected in court decisions 
 
Naidu AJ in Prochaska explained his views relating to the purpose of the Act. The Act has 
introduced ‘innovative mechanisms and concepts directed more at the protection and in 
the interests of credit consumers than of credit providers’.113  The NCA represents a ‘bold’ 
and ‘timely’ effort to make a ‘clean break’ from the past.114 The SCA in Rossouw also 
accepts that the main object of the Act is to protect consumers. However, it holds that the 
interests of creditors must also be safe guarded and should not be overlooked.115 The 
                                                            
111 (Fn 2). 
112 Van Eeden “Consumer Protection Law in South Africa” Lexis Nexis 2013 25. 
113 Prochaska (Fn 29) para 21. 
114 Ibid paras 15-16. 
115 Rossouw (Fn 31) para 17. 
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SCA goes further by concluding that the fact that the section 129 notice need not actually 
come to the attention of the consumer does not defeat the purposes of the NCA.   
 
The majority judgment in Sebola appreciated the force of the argument that the protection 
of consumer rights requires that primacy be given to section 129 (1).  The court accepted 
the submissions of the amicus curiae that one of the statute’s core innovations is that it 
is consumer friendly and promotes court avoidant procedures. The court accepted that 
access to debt counselling and extra-judicial resolution will undoubtedly have their most 
potent impact when the ‘guillotine is about to fall’. And it is at this point, before the credit 
provider resorts to court process, that the legislation insists the consumer should have 
the benefit of a notice.116   
 
Zondo AJ in a dissenting judgment in the Sebola matter with which Mogoeng CJ and 
Jaftha J concurred expresses the vital importance of the section 129 notice in that it 
makes the consumer aware that she is in default and of the credit provider’s proposal that 
the credit agreement be referred to a debt counsellor and ‘if there is a proposal that he 
refers the credit agreement, they can try to resolve it, debt restructuring can be resorted 
to, or the payments can be brought up-to-date’.117  Any interpretation of the NCA must 
promote the purposes of the NCA, and ‘actual awareness promotes not only consumer 
protection but also the use of non-judicial mechanisms for resolving disputes which the 
NCA so clearly requires’. 118 The minority judgment held therefore that the section 129 
notice must come to the attention of the consumer to be effective. To support its findings, 
the minority judgment held that section 129 (1) (a) was enacted ‘primarily, if not 
exclusively for the benefit and protection of the consumer.119 
 
Mhlantla AJ, writing for the majority in Kubyana, agrees that the NCA is directed at 
consumer protection. The court warns ‘however, this should not be taken to mean that 
the Act is relentlessly one-sided and concerned with nothing more than devolving rights 
                                                            
116 Sebola (Fn 24) paras 45 – 49. 
117 Ibid paras 60-61. 
118 Ibid para 103. 
119 Ibid para 107. 
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and benefits on consumers without any regard for interests of credit providers’.120 Turning 
to section 129 the court held that the purpose of section 129 is to ensure that the attention 
of the consumer is sufficiently drawn to her default. It further empowers the consumer 
with knowledge of the variety of options she may follow. The court confirmed the aim of 
the provision is to facilitate the consensual resolution of credit disputes.  Section 129 aims 
to establish a framework within which the parties to the credit agreement, in 
circumstances where the consumer has defaulted on her obligations, can come together 
and resolve their dispute without expensive, acrimonious and time-consuming recourse 
to the courts.121  
 
Jaftha J, writing a separate concurring judgment wrote that the object of sections 129 and 
130, ‘is not to exempt consumers from their contractual obligations but to afford them the 
opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the credit agreement in relation to payment of the 
debt’.122 
 
Murphy J in Dhlamini commented that the purpose of section 129 (1) (a) read with section 
3 (h), is to provide for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of 
disputes and debt restructuring arising from credit agreements and that section 129 (1) 
(a) was deliberately designed to protect these aims. A non-rebuttable presumption of 
service or notice on mere dispatch of a notice in terms of section 129 would defeat these 
aims.  To avoid unnecessary hardship and to comply with the objects of the NCA, the 
court concluded that section 129 (1) (a) required that a notice of any default by the 
consumer be brought to his or her actual attention, and that failure on the part of the credit 
provider to do so will bar the institution of legal proceedings, with the result that any action 





120 Kubyana (Fn 90) para 12. 
121 Ibid para 20. 
122 Ibid para 22. 
123 Dhlamini (Fn 34) paras 28-31. 
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7 3  Academic writers and commentators 
 
Woker confirms that the CPA together with the NCA promote ‘extensive consumer 
protection’. She argued that notwithstanding arguments that the legislation is 
unnecessary and will burden the South African economy further, this ignores the reality 
that consumers are vulnerable and that unfair practices are widespread.124  Kelly-Louw 
agrees that the section 129 (1) (a) notice serves an important purpose. She states the 
main purpose of section 129 (1) (a) is to place a duty on the credit provider to inform the 
consumer of the possible assistance that there is at her disposal before legal action will 
be instituted. In other words, the notice allows the consumer the opportunity to decide 
whether she wishes to use the available alternative methods first to try to resolve the legal 
disputes without the credit provider’s needing to resort to formal legal action. Section 129 
(1), among other things, encourages consumers to approach debt counsellors as soon 
as possible to assist them to develop and agree on a plan to bring their arrear payments 
under their credit agreements up to date.125  Van Heerden and Boraine agree with the 
views of Woker and Kelly-Louw. They confirm that the purpose of section 129 (1) (a) is 
that it presents a consumer with certain alternatives that he or she may consider prior to 
debt enforcement, in order to deal with the debt, alternatives which, if successful, might 
obviate the need for costly and often protracted litigation. It accordingly appears to be a 
compulsory procedure devised by the legislature in favour of the consumer obligating the 
credit provider to first propose certain alternatives by means of which the issue could 
possibly be resolved before turning   to   litigation.  Where a section 129 (1) (a) notice   is 
not delivered prior to the commencement of legal proceedings, the purpose of providing 
a means of avoiding litigation will be defeated.126   
 
Taylor encapsulates the views of academics relating to the NCA when he states: 
 
‘the Act focuses primarily on the consumer’s rights and consumer protection, and  
providing assistance to the generally uninformed public. This was required as credit 
                                                            
124 Woker (Fn 4) 230 – 231. 
125 Kelly-Louw (Fn 43) 579-583. 
126 Van Heerden and Boraine (Fn 40) para 3.8. 
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providers often included unreasonable provisions in the credit agreements.  That had 
a detrimental effect on consumers. On the other hand the interests of the credit 
provider are also protected as the Act aims to provide effective enforcement of debt 
as well as effective access to redress. Effective redress would entail general 
contractual concepts such as restitution or specific performance, depending on the 
circumstances. The Act strives to redress the situation without unnecessary 
interference with the relationship between the credit provider and the consumer. 
However, a certain amount of interference is inevitable as the main purpose of the 
Act is to restore the balance between the parties’ interests and the uneven 
bargaining position they find themselves in. The need for consumer protection is 
apparent as a result of the credit providers’ exploitation of the consumers’ lack of 
knowledge; however, the need to enable credit providers to enforce debt in a legal 
and acceptable manner is often understated’.127  
 
8 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR LAW IN RELATION 
 TO THE SECTION 129 (1) NOTICE 
 
8 1 Introductory remarks 
It is abundantly clear from an analysis of the authorities that the prevailing and 
overwhelming view is that the NCA is a consumer protection piece of legislation. It is 
readily conceded that the NCA seeks to balance the interests of the consumer with that 
of the credit provider. However, when a policy decision has to be made in circumstances 
where the interests of credit providers and consumers are substantially at odds and 
cannot be reconciled, in accordance with the main objective of the Act, it becomes 
imperative that the consumer protection objective of the legislation is afforded greater 
weight. Section 129 (1) (a) is an example of the need for a value judgment to be made. 
The Sebola judgment is a case in point. The majority, in attempting to balance the rights 
and interests  of  credit  providers  and  consumers,  arrived  at a  conclusion  which was 
dissented to by Zondo AJ, Mogoeng CJ and Jafta J on the basis that the ‘consumer 
protection’ purpose of the legislation was not afforded sufficient emphasis. 
                                                            
127 Taylor “Enforcement of debt in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 trial and celebration? A  




Section 129 (1) (a) therefore must be interpreted in accordance with the overriding policy 
objective of the NCA, namely, that of consumer protection. It follows that section 129 
fulfils a critical purpose in that it allows consumers and credit providers an opportunity to 
resolve disputes without having to resort to costly litigation.  
 
The NCAA is a retrogressive step in consumer protection legislation and appears to have 
been a measure aimed at assisting the banks. In this regard, it is extremely unfortunate 
that the Draft National Credit Act Policy Framework proclaims: ‘The NCA should preserve 
the policy of balancing of rights and should not prefer the rights of one stakeholder above 
the other. This is to ensure a sustainable consumer credit market’.128  It is illogical to 
assume that it is always possible not to prefer the rights of one stakeholder above the 
other when the stakeholders have opposite and competing interests.   
 
  
8 2 Court decisions criticizing large financial institutions 
  
Murphy J in Dhlamini made an important observation, in most cases involving credit 
agreements a home or a motor vehicle is involved. The loss of either of these assets 
invariably will have a significant deleterious effect on the life of a consumer.129 On the 
other hand the banks and other large credit providers have a major vested interest in the 
law relating to credit regulation given that consumer credit had ballooned to R1.39 trillion 
as at September 2012.  
 
Whilst recognising that some consumers are ‘serial defaulters’  and utilize the provisions 
of the NCA  merely to avoid payment of what is due to the credit providers the conduct 




128 Draft National Credit Act 2013 (Fn 5) para 2.1.4.9. 
129 Dhlamini (Fn 30) para 30. 
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Dhaya Pillay J In Standard Bank of South Africa vs Dhlamini130 criticised the bank and 
found that the bank had acted unfairly in a number of respects towards the defendant. 
For example, she found that the bank’s standard agreement was such a ‘formidable’ read, 
that to the defendant who could not read, write or understand English ‘there might just as 
well have been no written agreement at all’.131   
 
In this case the bank sought to hold Mr Dhlamini to a written agreement he had signed in 
respect of a motor vehicle. He had purchased the vehicle from a second hand motor 
vehicle dealer but the finance for the purchase had been provided by the bank. The dealer 
had facilitated the finance agreement. Mr Dhlamini returned the motor vehicle as a result 
of serious defects to the vehicle. The court declined to hold Mr Dhlamini bound to the 
agreement as, owing to the defendants illiteracy132 and the failure of the bank to explain 
the contents of the agreement in circumstances under which there was duty on the bank 
to do so, there was ‘no mutual consent’. Although this decision has been criticised as 
being criticised as being contrary to the principles of the law of contract, Louw regards it 
as an example of an emerging approach which emphasizes fairness and the pursuit of a 
contractual justice.133 This view is echoed by Woker who says ‘It does indicate that the 
judges are finally beginning to wake up to the realities of being an unsophisticated 
consumer in a very sophisticated economy’.134 
 
A summary judgment application served before the same judge in Absa Bank Ltd, v Jennifer 
Ester Pillay and Another.135 The court found that the bank falsely notified the respondents 
that payments in respect of the credit agreement were in arrears. The bank sought 
foreclosure notwithstanding the mortgage bond was not in arrears purely on the basis that 
the first respondent’s husband had passed away. The judge found this action constitutes: 
‘nothing short of bullying tactics by one of South Africa’s largest financial institutions against 
                                                            
130 2013 (1) SA 219 KZD. 
131 Ibid para 64. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Louw “Yet another call for a greater role for good faith in the South African Law of Contract, can we  
     banish the law of the jungle, while avoiding the elephant in the room” PER 2013 (16) 5 67-68. 
134 Woker Memorandum to Viren Singh. 
135 Unreported judgment delivered on 23rd October 2012, case nu. 4552/2012 (KZD). 
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a widow who is a historically disadvantaged person as defined in Section 2 (6) of the NCA . 
The Applicants conduct is premature and predatory’.136  
 
In the Papier matter, Griesel J (in dealing with the issue of termination of a debt review in 
term as of 86 (10) of the NCA) noted evidence that some credit providers terminate the 
process in terms of Section 86 (10) as a matter of course as soon as the 60 business days 
have expired  and that some  credit providers even  go so far as  postponing the hearing in 
the Magistrate’s Court and directly thereafter terminate the debt review in terms of Section 
86 (10) , followed by a summons and an application of a summary judgment.137  
 
8 3       Views of Penzhorn AJ 
Penzhorn AJ, sitting in the Durban High Court criticised financial institutions for 
‘unnecessarily selling people’s homes from under them’.138 The court queried several 
applications that came before him in which lenders were applying for default judgments 
against consumers, asking that the court declare their properties, usually primary 
residences, specifically executable.  
 
‘The court first queried one matter in  which a bank wanted an order against the 
owner who owed  R 14 000. 00 on a house he had owned for 11 years. Another 
matter of concern to the judge involved the property owned by a widow (83). ‘She 
has been living here for 30 years and she has had the bond since 1994. Her husband 
has died and her son has indicated she is trying to sort out the situation and now 
Absa wants to sell the house from under her’, the judge said. The report adds in 
another matter, where the money owing was under R 10 000. 00, he refused to grant 
judgment and ordered that the matter could not be re-enrolled until additional papers 
were drafted – confirming that the application had been served personally on the 
home owner, that the relief sought was fully explained to him or her, and that the 
opportunities given for the debt to become settled were detailed’.139  
                                                            
136 Ibid para 13. 
137 Papier (Fn 27) 395 et seq. 
138 Article published in the Natal Mercury, 24th June 2014, referring to case numbers 3549/14, 7247/13  





In a follow-up interview with Penzhorn AJ, the judge explained that the court has a 
discretion in deciding whether to declare consumers’ properties (which are their primary 
residences) executable. In exercising this discretion, he took into account that in the 
cases under discussion, the mortgage bond payments had a history of regular payment 
and that the amounts by which the mortgage bond was in arrears was not substantial. He 
referred to the 83 year old widow who was the respondent. Her bond payments only fell 
into default (after many years of regular payment) when her husband passed away. 
However, the executor of the husband’s estate, (her son) was making attempts to resolve 
the situation. The judge commented that the banks are in possession of most of the 
consumers’ contact information and that there should be an honest attempt to resolve 
these issues prior to resorting to heavy handed tactics. He deplored the conduct of Absa 
in this matter and questioned whether Absa’s head office in Johannesburg was even 
aware of these sorts of applications to sell off peoples’ homes. He referred to a matter 
which had served before him during a previous stint as acting judge regarding a consumer 
from Harding who had regularly  made   payment  for  more  than  ten  years,  and  for  
some  unknown  reason  (it  was  an application for default judgment so the consumer 
was not present in court) had recently fallen into arrears. He  adjourned  the  matter  for  
two  weeks and  ordered  that the bank’s  attorney  make contact with the consumer. On 
the return date the matter had been resolved.  He said that although the banks are, in 
law, entitled to declare a consumer’s property executable in the event of default, every 
possible step to avoid such a path should be followed. It is for this reason he ordered that 
an affidavit be filed detailing the steps the bank had taken to bring to the consumers’ 
attention the default and to explore other methods of resolving the dispute.140  
 
In a separate interview with  an attorney of over 30 years’ experience, Mr A. Haripersad, 
who was present in Court on the 23rd June 2014 when Penzhorn AJ made the orders, 
commented that counsel for the bank had argued that the refusal to grant orders declaring 
properties executable would affect the economy. Penzhorn AJ responded that it would 
                                                            
140 Interview with Penzhorn AJ of 30th July 2014. 
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affect the economy if peoples’ homes were sold when trifling amounts were owed to the 
banks.141  
 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Rob Davies, in arguing for the need for the National 
Credit Amendment Act said that ‘credit providers’ are using ‘legal proceedings such as 
repossessions of homes in total disregard of the mechanisms in place to assist 
consumers to meet their obligations’.142 Although Minister Davies has alluded to laudable 
objectives (of the NCAA) it appears that intensive lobbying by the banks have diluted 
these objectives.  
 
8 4 Critique of the NCAA 
In the credit industry we have two key role players whose interests are contradictory and 
irreconciable. It therefore becomes impossible not to, in specific circumstances, make a 
policy decision in favour of one or the other key role player. In order to do that, the primary 
purpose of the NCA must be given effect to. It has been accepted by the judiciary and 
academic writers and jurists in general that the primary purpose of the NCA is consumer 
protection. The provisions relating to ‘reckless lending’ and ‘over-indebtedness’, for 
example, clearly establish this fact. 
 
It is against this backdrop that one needs to assess the NCAA. The main criticisms 
levelled  at  the NCAA are that, firstly, on a literal interpretation of the amendment to 
section 129, a consumer may be in a worse  position than she was prior to the amendment 
and, secondly,  the  amendment  does not further the basic  purposes of the NCA and in 
fact runs counter to it. It will be argued that the drafters of the amendment chose to 
emphasise the interests of the banks over that of consumers. The chairperson of the 
Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry made the point that the amendments appear 
to have been made ‘in a determined attempt to listen to the banking industry’.143 
 
                                                            
141 Interview with Mr A Haripersad of 2nd July 2014. 
142 Rob Davies (Fn 109.) 
143 Patrick Mclaughlin, “National Credit Amendment Bill Changes” – www.dti.gov.za (accessed on 25th  
     June 2014).  
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In a report on the public hearings in Parliament, the following is stated: ‘BASA then took 
their place in the front row of seats. The row quickly filled up with multiple representatives 
from all the major banks. Cas Coovadia led the banks charge’. Inter alia, he said regarding 
section 86, BASA (Banking Association of South Africa) still want to exclude section 129 
notices from its ambit. BASA also want to be able to continue to terminate their 
participation in a debt review process as set out in the NCA as it is at present. They do 
not want to have to resolve matters at court. FNB (First National Bank) added that they 
were also not in favour of the proposed changes to section 86 (10), as the proposed 
amendment could be abused by ‘non-paying consumers putting the matter into court and 
then not paying’. Debt counsellors hit back that the banks abused section 86 (10) so much 
in the past that they now have no credibility in making demands regarding this section.144  
  
8 5 Interpretation of amendment 
 
It is clear that in terms of section 2 (1) of the NCA, a purposive interpretation must be 
followed in interpreting the amendment. This is confirmed in the Sebola judgment.145 
Accordingly, the proper approach would be that followed by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environment Affairs:146  
 
‘The emerging trend in statutory construction is to have regard to the context in which 
the words occur, even where the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous. 
Recently, in Thoroughbred Breeders Association v Price Waterhouse,147 the SCA 
has reminded us that the days are long past when blinkered peering at an isolated 
provision in a statute was thought to be the only legitimate technique in interpreting 
it if it seemed on the face of it to have a readily discernible meaning’.148 
 
On a literal, conservative interpretation the plain ordinary grammatical meaning of the 
words contained in the subsection must be given effect to. Once the court is satisfied that 
                                                            
144 National Debt Mediation Association, Quarterly Newsletter, May 2014 www.dti.co.za (accessed 25th  
     June 2014). 
145 Sebola (Fn 24) paras 45-49. 
146 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
147 2001 (4) SA 551 (SCA). 
148 Bato Star Fishing (Fn 146) 490. 
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the notice has been sent to the correct post office, the requirement of the section 129 (1) 
(a) notice would have been satisfied.  There is no room in these circumstances for the 
consumer to satisfy the court that in fact she did not receive the notice even if she was a 
‘reasonable consumer’.149   
 
The absence, for example, of the words ‘prima facie proof’ in the subsection under 
discussion supports such an interpretation. On this interpretation, notwithstanding non 
receipt of the notice it is not open to the consumer to rely on the fact that she did not 
receive the notice (even if she had been in hospital in a coma at the time the notice was 
delivered to the correct post office).  For example, Section 212 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act150 provides that certain documents may be handed into court, as ‘prima facie proof’ 
of the contents of such documents. The addition of the words ‘prima facie proof’ will then 
clearly allow an accused person an opportunity to dispute that the documents sought to 
be handed in constitute conclusive proof of its contents.  
 
Alternatively, the legislature uses the phrase unless the ‘contrary is shown’, or ‘unless 
there is an indication to the contrary’ or unless ‘the contrary is proved’. This rebuttable 
presumption is contained in, for example, the now repealed Abuse of Dependence 
Producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act.151 The purpose of these provisions 
was and is to allow a party to the litigation to rebut the presumption that she is, for 
example, in possession of drugs or that she was dealing in drugs. Section 73 and 74 of 
the Road Traffic Act provide further examples.152  
 
If, indeed, this is the interpretation placed by our courts on the subsection, this would 
have adverse effect on the consumer and place her in a worse position than she was 
prior to the amendment. In regard to delivery by registered post, even in the Munien153 
matter, Wallis J concluded that although the risk  of  non- receipt  would  lie  with  the 
consumer as the consumer would have chosen the method of delivery, he accepted , that 
                                                            
149 Kubyana (Fn 90) para 37. 
150 Act 51 of 1977. 
151 Act 41 of 1971. 
152 Act 93 of 1996. 
153 Munien (Fn 38) para 31. 
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the onus of proving delivery of the section 129 (1) (a) notice rested on the credit provider. 
The court held that the fact that the legislature granted the consumer a right to choose  
the  manner  of  delivery inexorably pointed to an intention to place the risk of non-receipt 
on the consumer’s shoulders and the actual receipt of the section 129 (1) notice is the 
consumer’s responsibility.  
 
The Sebola judgment expressly gives the consumer the opportunity to prove that she did 
not receive the notice.  The court says: ‘Where the credit provider posts  the notice, proof 
of registered dispatch to the address of the consumer , together with proof  that the notice 
reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, will in the absence of a 
contrary indication constitute proof of delivery. If in contested proceedings the consumer 
avers that the notice did not reach him or her, the Court must establish the truth of the 
claim’.154  
 
The Binneman judgment criticised the phrase ‘in the absence of a contrary indication’. 
The court in Kubyana clarified the phrase as follows.  
 
‘A contrary indication would be a factor showing that, in the circumstances and 
despite the credit provider’s efforts, the notification did not reach the consumer’s 
designated address. The second inference is based on the assumption that a 
consumer acting reasonably would, having received the notification from the Post 
Office to retrieve an item, proceed to collect the notice. In these circumstances, a 
contrary indication would be a factor showing that the consumer acted reasonably in 
failing to collect or attend to the notice, despite the delivery of the notification of her 
address’.155  
 
It is earnestly hoped that the courts, in interpreting the subsection do not come to the 
conclusion that it precludes the consumer from establishing that, in fact, through no fault 
of her own, she did not receive the section 129 (1) (a) notice. A logical and sensible 
argument can be made out, on a purposive interpretation, that the legislature could not 
have intended such a result as it would lead to an absurdity (in that the crucial purpose 
                                                            
154 Sebola (Fn 24) para 87. 
155 Kubyana (Fn 90) para 52. 
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of section 129 with then be nullified). A further indication that on a purposive interpretation, 
the above absurdity would not result are the provisions of section 130 (3), which provide 
that a court may only determine a matter if it is satisfied that the provisions of section 129 
have been complied with.  It is arguable that a court will only be satisfied that the 
provisions of section 129 have been complied with if the probabilities favour the 
conclusion that the notice was, in fact, brought to the attention of the consumer.  
 
In the event that our courts interpret the provision contrary to the interests of the consumer 
it is theoretically possible that a consumer will challenge the constitutionality of the 
subsection, possibly on the basis that the subsection contravenes section 10 of the 
Constitution, 1996, in that it has the effect of infringing the dignity of the consumer as it 
violates the consumer’s socio-economic rights. In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz and Others.156 Makgoro J commented (albeit obiter) that the 
Constitutional Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Grootboom and Others157 made it clear that any claim based on socio-economic rights 
must necessarily engage the right to dignity.… ‘Each time an applicant approaches the 
Courts claiming that his or her socio–economic rights have been infringed the right to 
dignity is invariably implicated’.158  
 
It is unlikely, however, that a constitutional challenge would succeed. The counter 
argument is that the Act balances the rights of the credit providers and consumers and 
that in accordance with this policy the subsection was passed. The subsection cannot be 
said to be contrary to the principle of legality or in any way irrational or even overbroad.  
Even if the consumer proves that his right to dignity has been impaired, the limitation 






156 2003 (10) BCLR 1149 (CC). 
157 2001 (1) SA  46 (CC). 
158 Ibid para 21. 
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8 6 The amendment does not accord with the purposes of the NCA 
 
The debate in the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court 
revolve around the manner in which the section 129 (1) (a) notice must be brought to the 
attention of the consumer. The courts differed on whether the risk of non-receipt of the 
section 129 (1) (a) notice rested with the consumer or credit provider. Each court sought 
to justify its decision by adopting a particular interpretation.  In order to assess which 
interpretation ought to have   been adopted, which in turn would have informed the 
amendment of the NCA, it is necessary to examine the reasons provided for adopting the 
interpretation the court did in fact adopt. 
  
Wallis J in the Munien case provided the following reasons for adopting the approach that 
he did.  He said that in previous consumer legislation such as the section 12 (b) of the 
Old Hire Purchase Act159 the default notice need not have been served on the consumer. 
He reasoned further that if the legislature had intended that the notice must come to the 
actual attention of the consumer, it would have said so in plain language. He further stated 
that although he considered the purposes of the NCA, they should not alter the plain 
meaning of the wording in the definition of ‘delivered’ as contained in regulation 1 of the 
regulations to the Act.  
 
Zondo AJ in the Sebola dissenting judgment deals with the argument relating to other 
legislative enactments and the impact they have on the interpretation of the NCA. At 
common law, Zondo AJ argues that notice of termination of a contract is required to reach 
the mind of the other party. He reasons that it would be contrary to logic and common 
sense that the NCA, which is consumer protection legislation, would seek to give less 
rights to a party to a contract than would the common law. 
 
In regard to the interpretation of similar statutes, Zondo AJ disagreed with the view of 
Wallis J that, for example, Section 12 (b) of the Hire Purchase Act  did not require that 
the notice come to the actual attention of the consumer. Zondo J referred to both the Hire 
                                                            
159 Act 36 of 1942. 
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Purchase Act as well as section 13 (1) of the Sale of Land in Instalments Act.160  Zondo 
AJ also relied on Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd161 in reaching a 
different conclusion to that reached by Wallis J . Moreover, as pointed out by Van Heerden 
and Boraine, the NCA is a much more comprehensive piece of legislation than the 
repealed Credit Agreements Act.162 Woker also agrees that the CPA and the NCA provide 
comprehensive and extensive protection.163 It was precisely because the Credit 
Agreements Act was defective in many respects that the NCA was enacted. The 
Constitutional Court in Sebola agreed that the NCA constitutes a decisive break from the 
past.164 Finally the contents of section 13 of the Credit Agreements Act differ substantially 
from the contents of section 129 (1) (a) and 130 (1) (a) of the NCA.   
 
Wallis J further argued the legislature would have made it clear in the event that it required 
the notice to come to the actual attention of the consumer. With respect, this is a marginal 
argument, as the legislature did not make it clear one way or another. Moreover, the lack 
of clarity in the draftmanship of the Act has been commented upon by numerous jurists, 
including the Constitutional Court. For example, in Starita, the court pointed out that the 
Act was badly drafted.165 Cameron J in the Sebola judgment says ‘The lack of clarity in 
the drafting of the Act has justly been bemoaned’.166 The court in  Nedbank Ltd and Others 
v National Credit Regulator and Another167  said ‘there were numerous drafting errors, 
untidy expressions and inconsistencies make interpreting the Act a particularly trying 
exercise’.  
 
In regard to Wallis J’s reliance on regulation 1 of the regulations to the NCA, Gautschi AJ, 
in Starita, disagrees with his interpretation even though the court in Starita also concluded 
that actual receipt of the notice was not required. Gautschi AJ held that a clear answer to 
the ‘interpretation question’ was to be found in sections 65 and 168 of the Act and that 
                                                            
160 Act 72 of 1971. 
161 1976 (4) SA 994 (A). 
162 Van Heerden and Boraine (Fn 46). 
163 Woker (Fn 4) 217. 
164 Sebola (Fn 24) para 39. 
165 Starita (Fn 38) para 18.9. 
166 Sebola (Fn 24) para 66. 
167 2011 (3) SA 581 SCA. 
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regulation 1 of the regulations to the Act could not be used to interpret the Act.168 In this 
argument, Gautschi AJ is supported by Kelly-Louw.169 The ‘Sebola’ judgment expressly 
disavows the reasoning of Wallis J on this point.170 
 
 
One of the themes that permeate the arguments of the banks is that to require proof that 
the notice actually came to the attention of the consumer would be to place too onerous 
an obligation on the banks. Olsen AJ noted evidence of the large number of section 129 
letters which were returned unclaimed. ABSA Bank kept records for the period January 
to May 2012 in respect of the whole of South Africa. Between 66.3 percent and 70 percent 
of all letters were returned ‘unclaimed’.171  
 
Based on this evidence, it is apparent that the sending of a registered letter amounts to 
an untenable legal fiction that the notice did in fact come to the attention of the consumer, 
as is required in terms of the NCA. When one considers this argument (that it would be 
too onerous a duty on the banks to expect more) against the critical importance of the 
Section 129 notice, the banks argument pales into insignificance. As Zondo AJ points out:  
 
‘In South Africa the majority, if not all, of the people who are subject to this poor 
postal service are black and poor. They form part of the group that the NCA seeks 
to protect and benefit under Sections 129 (1) (a) and 130. In my view, as far as 
possible, an interpretation that will prejudice so large a section of the people that the 
NCA seeks to protect should be avoided. In the construction of Sections 129 (1) (a) 
and 130 (1) (a), it is possible to avoid such an interpretation’.172  
 
These passages surely illustrate that sending a notice by registered post does not 
necessarily mean that such notice will come to the attention of the consumer and if the 
notice does not come to the attention of the consumer, then the overriding purpose of 
section 129 is defeated.  
                                                            
168 Starita (Fn 32) 443. 
169 Kelly-Louw (Fn 43) 585. 
170 Sebola (Fn 24) para 61. 
171 Mkhize (Fn 80) para 20-21. 




Penzhorn AJ in his interview referred to the ‘ostrich’ or ‘head in the sand’ approach.173  
Essentially this means that consumers would attempt to evade the reality of the default 
by hiding or running away from their repayment obligations, by burying their ‘heads in the 
sand’. The Constitutional Court also recognises that it is only when the guillotine is about 
to fall that people will be forced to take action.174 This reinforces the view that sending a 
registered letter to a post office closest to the address chosen by the consumer in the 
credit agreement will not be effective in bringing the default to her attention. 
 
It follows that the reasoning in the Munien case which laid the foundation for the 
interpretation that the notice does not have to come to the actual attention of the 
consumer is fallacious. Notwithstanding this fallacious reasoning, however, the NCAA 
has given effect to it. The Constitutional court in Sebola made it clear that ordinarily (in 
default judgment applications) the fact that a registered letter was sent to the correct post 
office would be sufficient ‘prima facie’ proof (in the absence of any denial of receipt by the 
consumer) that the notice was received by the consumer). In an opposed trial the issue 
of the receipt of the notice would be fully ventilated and the court would make a finding. 
It is submitted that the onus would be on the credit provider as plaintiff to prove this fact, 
although the consumer may be saddled with an ‘evidential burden’. 
 
I am in respectful agreement with the view of Zondo AJ, Mogoeng CJ and Jafta J when they 
hold: 
 
‘in my view  of section 129 (1) (a) , which entails that the credit provider must make 
the consumer  aware  of  the default and of the proposal contemplated in Section 
129 (1) (a), accords with the language of the  provision, is fair, gives effect to the 
purpose of Section 129 (1) (a) and gives appropriate weight to the legislature’s 
intention to make cancellation and judicial enforcement of credit agreement 
measures of last resort  that must be resorted to when the dispute resolution 
                                                            
173 Fn 135. 
174 Sebola (Fn 24) para 59. 
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mechanisms prescribed by the NCA  have been exhausted and the consumer has 
been afforded an opportunity to avoid such steps’.175  
 
 An argument raised by the banks and accepted by Wallis J and even the SCA in Rossouw 
is that it would be virtually impossible for credit providers to prove that the  notice  has  
actually  come  to  the  attention  of  the  consumer.  If, for example, the consumer, having 
received the notice and refuses to read the notice she can then be taken to have waived her 
rights in relation to the notice. In all other instances, however, it would be possible to prove 
to the court on a balance of probabilities that the notice came to the actual attention of the 
consumer. If a registered letter is sent, the recipient is required to produce a copy of her 
identity document and to acknowledge receipt of the registered letter in writing. That would 
ordinarily constitute sufficient proof.  
 
In the event, however, that the letter is returned ‘unclaimed’ by the postal service, then other 
reasonable steps would have to be taken. Olsen AJ recommended that the notice also be 
sent by ordinary post.176 There has also been a suggestion that an employee from the bank 
visit the consumer and either depose to an affidavit or get the consumer to acknowledge 
receipt of the notice in writing.177 However, given the conduct of some of the agents of the 
bank when such agents seek to get consumers to sign ‘voluntary surrenders’ and the tactics 
they use (anecdotal horror stories abound), it would be preferable, in my view, for the notice 
to be served by the sheriff as is the case with summons.  
   
The argument raised by the banks is that this would produce an onerous burden on the 
sheriffs who would be unable to meet the demand given the large number of notices sent 
out. A further argument raised is that this would escalate costs which would eventually be 
to the detriment of the consumer. Dealing with this latter argument first, in an urban non-
urgent service, the sheriff’s fee (in Durban) is rarely more than R250 to R300. Given the 
importance of the notice, that it is the last step prior to the institution of legal proceedings, 
this cost either to the consumer or to the bank is not overly burdensome. In order to sign a 
                                                            
175 Sebola (Fn 24) para 176. 
176 Mkhize (Fn 80) paras 66-76. 
177 Ibid para 77. 
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standard term credit agreement relating to, for example, a motor vehicle the ‘administration’ 
or ‘initiation’ fee relating to this is in excess of R500.178  An administration fee of not less 
than R50 is charged on every payment made even though the systems are highly 
computerised.179  Moreover, this process of engaging the consumers should be seen by the 
banks as a means to prevent the escalation of costs, as it is possible that the matter may be 
resolved without litigation. In regard to the issue of the lack of capacity of the sheriffs, surely 
it should not lie in the mouths of the banks to raise this point but rather from the sheriffs 
themselves. It is extremely unlikely that the sheriffs would object as they would stand to 
benefit from this additional service. In the event of a recalcitrant consumer a further 
argument raised by the banks is they would evade service of the section 129 (1) (a) notice. 
In such event, the rules relating to substituted service (as provided for in the Uniform Rules 
of Court), or approaching a court for directions as to an acceptable mode of service of the 
section 129 (1) (a) notice would remedy this problem.  
 
In the event that this view is regarded as unreasonable and unworkable, then, it is 
submitted that, at the minimum, in the case of credit agreements relating to immovable 
property, the section 129 (1) (a) notice should be served personally on the consumer as 
it may impact on his right to housing. Indeed, when a consumer’s  primary residence is at 
stake, a section 129 (1) (a) notice should be notifying the debtor that, should action be 
instituted and judgment obtained against her, execution against her residence will 
ordinarily follow and usually lead to her eviction therefrom.180 Whilst making this judicial 
injunction, in the same breath, courts are expected to uphold the legal fiction contained 
in the NCAA knowing very well that the notice has, in fact, not come to the attention of 
the consumer. ‘Poverty come and see it lives in the shanty. Come look and see poverty 
it smells, it can be touched’ are powerful words written by Mongane Wally Serote in 
‘Freedom Lament and Song’.181 Section 26 of the Constitution is our response to the blight 
of poverty.  It is a most basic right and encompasses the right to dignity.  
 
                                                            
178 Mercedes Benz Financial Services v Power Ahead CC – unreported case number 12444/11 (KZD). 
179 Ibid. 
180 FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher 2011 (4) SA 314 (GNP). 
181 Cheadle et al  ‘South African Constitutional Law’, The Bill of Rights Issue 1 21-1. 
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Makgoro J in Jaftha v Schoeman and Others and Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others182  
quotes with approval the immortal words of Mahomed J writing with reference to the death 
penalty.  
 
‘All Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity and detail  the 
shared aspirations of a nation; the values which bind it’s people , and which discipline 
its government and its national institutions; the basic  premises upon which judicial, 
legislative and executive power is to be wielded; the constitutional limits and the 
conditions upon which that power is to exercised; the national  ethos  which  defines 
and regulates that exercise ; and moral and ethical direction which that nation has 
identified for its future. In some countries the Constitution only formalises, in a legal 
instrument, a historical consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally 
from a stable and unbroken past to accommodate the needs of the future. The South 
African Constitution is different; it retains from the past only   what   is defensible and 
represents a decisive break form and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past which 
is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive , and  a  vigorous  
identification  of  and  commitment  to  a  democratic  ,   universalistic ,   caring   and 
aspirationally egalitarian ethos  articulated in the Constitution . The contrast between 
the past which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to commit the nation is 
stark and dramatic’.183  
 
Mokgoro J goes on to extol the importance of having one’s own home. ‘Relative to 
homelessness , to have a home one calls one’s own, even under the most basic 
circumstances , can be a most empowering and dignifying human experience’.184  
 
Section 4 (2) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act185 (PIE) provides that ‘at least 14 days before the hearing of the proceedings 
contemplated in subsection (1), the court must serve written and effective notice of the 
proceedings on the unlawful occupier and the municipality having jurisdiction’. 
  
                                                            
182 2005 1 BCLR 78 (CC) – (hereafter ‘Jaftha’). 
183 S v Makwanyane 1996 1 388 CC. 
184 Jaftha (Fn 182) para 39. 
185 Act 19 of 1998 – (hereafter ‘PIE’). 
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The courts have consistently interpreted the section to mean that even prior to serving 
the section 4 (2) notice on the illegal occupier, the consent of the court must first be 
obtained. It is a notice sanctioned by the court that is served on the illegal occupier. 
Section 4 (4) of the Act further prescribes that the court must be satisfied with service and 
must consider the rights of the unlawful occupier to receive adequate notice and to defend 
the case.  This subsection has resulted in an almost immutable rule that there must be 
personal service on the illegal occupier. The rationale for the rule is that it enhances the 
right contained in section 26 of the Constitution, 1996.186 
  
Olsen AJ points out, when a court has to consider a PIE application and it comes to the 
attention of the court that the section 129 (1) notice did not come actually to the attention 
of the consumer, the court may take that fact into account in the exercise of the court’s 
discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the eviction application.187  I am not certain 
that the courts would in fact adopt such an approach as section 4 (8) of PIE states as 
follows:  ‘If the court is satisfied that all requirements of this section have been complied 
with and that no valid defence has been raised by the unlawful occupier, it must be grant 
an order for the eviction of the unlawful occupier….’  
 
Be that as it may, the gateway provision that opens the path to the eventual eviction (if 
the option of debt counselling is not followed) is section 129 of the NCA. The purpose of 
the NCA is pursued through the ‘consensual resolution of disputes arising from credit 
agreements’. A section 129 (1) notice plays an essential role in achieving this purpose by 
requiring a credit provider  to draw a defaulting consumer’s attention to the fact that he 
may pursue the assistance of a ‘debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, 




186 For example, see Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v   
     City of Johannesburg and 3 Others 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
187 Mkhize (Fn  80) para. 
188 Fuchs ‘The impact of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 on the enforcement of a mortgage bond:  
     Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa 2012 5 SA 142 CC’ PER 2013 (16) 3 377. 
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Relying on an acceleration clause in a standard term contract formulated by the banks, 
even if the arrears is for a trifling amount, default judgment will be sought and most 
probably granted . A standard prayer in a summons issued by the bank is to ‘declare the 
immovable property specifically executable’.  Once this has been done the consumer is 
in illegal occupation of the property and accordingly there would be no defence to the 
application for the consumer’s eviction. (As an aside, although section 4 (2) provides for 
notice to be served on the municipality, the Ethekwini municipality simply ignores this 
notice and the organ of state’s constitutional responsibility in this regard is generally 
ignored). At best, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may delay he eviction process 
to afford the consumer an opportunity to obtain alternative housing. 
 
The impact of section 129 (1) (a) on the consumer’s right to housing is real. Kelly-Louw 
agrees with the court in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Maleke and Three Similar Cases189  that the 
section 129 (1) (a) notice itself (not only the summons), if applicable, should also inform 
the consumer of her right of access to adequate housing set out in section 26 of the 
Constitution and contain an explicit warning to the consumer that she may end up losing 
her home by way of an execution sale if the credit provider is successful with his legal 
action.190  
 
I regret to conclude that the banks are riding roughshod over consumer rights in regard 
to section 129 (1) (a). The reason for this is obvious. In the event that the consumer does 
go to an alternative dispute resolution agent or to a debt counsellor, a process will be 
embarked upon which may delay payment in terms of the credit agreement to the bank. 
It may even have an effect of the bank having to renegotiate the terms of the agreement 
which may result in financial loss.  
 
As early as 2008, Kelly-Louw said the following: 
 
‘There is a huge potential demand for debt-counselling assistance and it is estimated 
that 300 000 South African consumers find themselves in an extreme over-indebted 
                                                            
189 2010 (1) SA 143 (GSJ). 
190 Kelly-Louw (Fn 43) 200. 
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position, while   a   further million or more are potentially debt-stressed. It would thus 
appear that debt counselling has a very important role to play. In the FinMark Trust 
research report referred to above, researchers correctly observed that debt 
counsellors would provide important social support, but preventing over 
indebtedness is equally as important as solving the problem after the fact’.191  
 
Kelly-Louw’s forecast has been proved correct. The debt review process has attracted 
some 363 000 individuals who have applied for debt counselling by the end of June 2012 
and some R 8.5 billion  has been distributed to credit providers through the process.192 
 
 
8 7  Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from this dissertation, this conundrum cannot easily be resolved. Otto 
concludes: 
 
‘to find a solution to the problem highlighted in this note is not easy . The cases 
discussed illustrate this. The judges held different views bases on their individual 
interpretations of words and expressions in the NCA and on the purposes of the Act. 
Consumer credit legislation is an emotive issue. There are different interests at 
stake, and it is not difficult for judges and the public at large (which includes 
consumers and credit providers alike) to hold different views. It is possible for men 
of good faith to differ substantially’.193 
 
 
Sebola has come and gone. Kubyana has come and gone, The NCAA is a fait accompli 
even though the implementation date has not been fixed. The only two remaining 
questions are: firstly how these provisions are to be interpreted by our courts and 
secondly how are the purposes of the NCA best achieved given the current objective 
conditions. 
                                                            
191 Ibid 225. 
192 Draft National Credit Act Policy Review Framework (Fn 5) para 1.9.4. 




Wallis J accepted that the onus of proving that the section 129 (1) (a) notice was in fact 
given rested on the credit provider.  It was only the risk of non-receipt that was on the 
consumer. It is earnestly hoped that our courts would still allow a defence that the notice 
did not actually come to the attention of the consumer through no fault of her own. The 
concept of a ‘reasonable consumer’, in the light of the prevailing conditions is our best 
option. This dissertation does not seek to protect serial defaulters or consumers who 
actively evade receipt of notices and legal documents. It is aimed at those consumers 
who genuinely have not received section 129 notices through no fault of their own.  
Perhaps protection should be extended to these consumers who have not notified the 
banks of the change of the domicilium address  but such change of address is known to 
the banks through their own investigations or when the ‘new address’ is easily obtainable 
(perhaps via telephonic contact). This is in line with the evidence led by Absa Bank before 
Olsen AJ wherein the bank averred that prior to instituting legal proceedings, attempts 
are made to contact the consumers. Surely during these telephonic contacts, any change 
of address details could be obtained.194 At the very least, it should not be countenanced 
that, even though the credit provider is aware that the ‘domicilium citandi et executandi’ 
address is not the address at which the consumer resides, service at that address should 
be regarded as sufficient compliance, even though the consumer (who may not fully 
understand the importance of choosing or changing his service address) did not in terms 
of the conditions contained in the credit agreement advise the credit provider of the 
change of address.   
 
 
I am of the view, however, that the only resolution to this conundrum is the education of 
consumers. Section 3 (1) (e) of the CPA provides that one of the purposes of the Act is 
to improve consumers awareness and information and encourage responsible and 
informed consumer choice and behaviour.  Section 3 (2) of the CPA provides that the 
Commission (the National Consumer Commission) shall take reasonable measures to 
promote the Act and advance the interest of consumers and conduct research and 
                                                            
194 Mkhize (Fn 80). 
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propose policy. In terms of section 96 of the CPA, the Commission is responsible to 
increase knowledge and to develop and implement education and information measures 
in the community.  
 
 
Section 3 (e) provides one of the purposes of the NCA as:  
 
‘addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and 
credit providers by  
(i) Providing consumers with the education about credit and consumer   
rights; 
(ii) Providing consumers  with  adequate  disclosure  of  standardised   
information in order to make informed choices ; …’ 
 
The CPA as well as the NCA have generated awareness and interest in consumer 
protection legislation. The internet has facilitated access to information. Academics and 
journalists have also contributed to the growth of the consumer movement. The consumer 
movement must be strengthened.  The National Credit Regulator (NCR) has already 
assisted the consumer by seeking various declaratory orders from the courts and by 
spreading the message of consumer rights. A strong powerful consumer movement will 
balance the immense power wielded by the banks. Given the NCAA in relation to section 
129, consumers will have to look after themselves. Consumers need to be made aware 
that if they are in trouble with making their credit payments timeously, they need to take 
urgent action and not to adopt the ‘head in the sand’ approach.  
 
Subsection 129 (5) (b) provides that the section 129 (1) (a) notice must be delivered to 
‘an adult person at the location designated. Subsection129 (7) (b) is satisfied by the 
signature or identifying mark of the recipient. Subsection 6 gives the consumer the choice 
between registered mail and service on an adult person at the location designated by the 
consumer. It is crucial, I submit, in order that the section 129 (1) (a) notice meets its 
laudatory objectives, for consumers to be encouraged (even by means of media 
advertising) to choose subsection 5 (b) of the NCAA. Regrettably, I suggest that credit 
Page | 54  
 
providers will encourage consumers to choose the “registered letter” route. Further, in line 
with our law of contract, consumers should be required to sign at the appropriate 
paragraph of the credit agreement confirming that this choice has been explained to them. 
Perhaps this clause should be in “bold print” to alert a consumer to this choice. In this 
event, even if a consumer moves from his chosen address, depending on  the court’s 
interpretation, credit providers may have to make further attempts to locate the consumer 
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